Entry Point: A quick look at North Korea’s nuclear policy

Min Cheong

The Pongyang factor in an East Asia Arms Race

The Pongyang factor in an East Asia Arms Race

Contrary to conventional sentiment, the continuous augmentation of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities is a manifestation of calculated national security policy as opposed to a reactionary show of might or a leverage-strengthening tool used to extricate concessions from its neighbours and other countries as well as non-state entities alike.

This observation was put forth by Dr. Jonathon D. Pollack, senior fellow with the John L. Thornton China Center, in his book, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security.

Speaking at the launch of the tome, held as a segment within the programme of The Shangri-La Dialogue 2011, Pollock refuted the notion of instability within the North Korean regime and highlighted the fact that despite twenty years of speculation pertaining to its imminent collapse, the DPRK has always possessed a robust, self-preserving political structure and remains resilient as ever in pursuing its goals, one of which is to be recognised as a legitimate nuclear power.

In terms of advancements made on the technological front, Dr Pollack postulated that North Korea is now equipped with the ability to construct several new nuclear devices with the quantity of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) the state has accrued and will possibly exhibit its prowess vis-a-vis a test detonation. Such an ominous development could culminate in a distinct shift in current attitudes towards the DPRK, thereby resulting in a deviation from Liberalism in dealing with the North’s nuclear ambitions and regression towards Realist approaches in crafting and reviewing the region’s security architecture.

However, it is clear that North Korea will not be cowed into acquiescing to the West’s demands, particularly due to the fact that it has been able to achieve nuclear weaponisation through means and with technology that can be considered a divergence from the norm, setting the state apart from recognised members of the international nuclear country club and thus demonstrating the initial viability of an alternative route to nuclear weapons capability.

Responding to questions regarding China’s influence on the DPRK’s security policy, Pollack asserted the notion that the former holds significantly low clout in that aspect of its relationship with North Korea, as with other nations within and outside the region. In fact, China has viewed the DPRK as a liability increasingly of late and has adopted a strategy of containment towards the latter.

The DPRK’s steadfast determination to attain nuclear parity has created a quandary unlike any other. Unlike Iran, whose government has typically brandished the threat of nuclearisation in an adversarial attempt to unite the Middle East under Iranian leadership and also to direct attention away from domestic issues, North Korea has no such agenda – proliferation in the DPRK’s case is aligned with existing security objectives and initiatives.

Pertaining to resolving the nuclear predicament, it is crucial that discourse and diplomacy be employed liberally in a genuine effort to engage North Korea. Any progress made will not be sustained under a policy of what is termed ‘strategic patience’, which is essentially a strategy involving inertia and reluctant tolerance of status quo.

Moreover, there should be acknowledgement of the notion that despite the DPRK’s impingement of perspicuous and implicit regional and international security rules, the United States’ tactics have been largely counter-productive and have on occasion contributed to exacerbating instability within the Korean peninsula. American intervention has mostly not yielded positive results because of the iteration of requisite pre-talks stipulations unrealistic as preconditions precisely because they are desired outcomes of negotiation and require that dialogue be engaged in order for resolution to be reached.

In essence, dealing with North Korea in lieu of its nuclear programme will only be effective if enlightened analysis is accepted and assimilated into the conceptualisation and application of diplomatic strategy, and Pollack’s writings carry much credence in purveying novel ideas which could very well lead to a more prudent engagement process.

No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security is insightful and brutally honest in its characterisation of international nuclear politics revolving around the DPRK and sheds new light upon the state’s psychological profile and security policy with regard to the development of its nuclear programme.


Photo courtesy of China Digital Times.