Military build-up and promoting track II diplomacy in ASEAN

Kelvin Teo

The post Cold War period saw ASEAN states spend more on modern military hardware than they had before the war, which points to a possible intra-ASEAN arms build-up. There was a brief hiatus in the build-up as a result of the 1997 Asian Financial crisis, followed by resumption. This led to speculation on whether there was an arms race in Southeast Asia. The first pertinent question is what constitutes an arms race? An arms race involves each side acquiring weapons in order to gain a strategic advantage over the others, with each being potential enemies in an armed conflict.

Shaun Narine, currently an Associate Professor at St. Thomas University analysed the arms build-up situation within Southeast Asia in his book entitled “Explaining ASEAN: regionalism in Southeast Asia”. As narrated by Narine, the arms build-up was attributed to the following factors: 1) Unresolved territorial disputes and conflicts over maritime borders that existed between ASEAN states, for instance in the example of Malaysia which was involved in maritime and territorial disputes with Philippines and Thailand. 2) Historically-based ethnic and political tensions still existed between ASEAN states; for instance, Singapore still plans its defense strategies on the assumption that Malaysia and Indonesia are threats 3) A source of bargaining power in the event of low-level conflicts – ASEAN states do not want to be at a strategic disadvantage when discussing such disputes 4) Image where weapons acquisition are seen as a form of prestige 5) Reduced US presence in the region and hence greater need to acquire weapons to deal with potential uncertainty 6) A lucrative market for weapons supply; the end of the Cold War saw the loss of markets for arms suppliers and hence, the latter’s desire to seek clients in Southeast Asia. 7) Perceived threats outside ASEAN, e.g. China.

Amitav Archarya, currently Professor of International Relations at American University analysed the defense expenditures in terms of each ASEAN member’s state national currencies and the component of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the data appears conflicting. When measured in terms of their respective national currencies, there was an upward trend in terms of defense expenditure, but the rate of spending as a percentage of GDP actually declined, especially in the cases of Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. Singapore is the exception in the midst of the general trend that defense expenditures as a component of GDP generally declined. The explanation for the inconsistency between national currencies measurements and percentage GDP expenditures can be put to the fact that ASEAN states have grown in terms of economic prosperity, and hence the GDP growth.

Going back to the earlier question – is there an arms race in the ASEAN region? There is a general consensus among scholars that the military build-up in ASEAN is not so much an arms race where states involved are potential enemies (see earlier definition), but rather it is part of the “worst case scenario” approach adopted by the ASEAN military planners in the event of an armed conflict between ASEAN states whose chances of occurring are remote. Hence, it will be apt to define the phenomenon of arms acquisition amongst ASEAN states as “arms build-up per se” rather than an “arms race” (which have connotations of enemy states).

The question is whether this military build-up would be the right way to go? Enrico Spolaore published an interesting paper entitled “National Borders, Conflict and Peace” accessible at Tufts University that simulated various scenarios of conflicts between states including alliances. First and foremost, it must be recognised that defense and security should be considered among the most important public goods provided by the government. With that in mind, a scenario simulated by Spoloare comprised two military alliances against a third aggressor. What was demonstrated in the simulation was that the same level of protection was offered against the aggressor as that when provided by each state for itself. The real benefit was that the same level of military protection was achieved with lower level of military spending per capita for both states. Hence, such a military alliance allows economies of scale for defense to be achieved, i.e. achieving the same level of military protection with less spending per head within each state. Thus, would it be viable for ASEAN states to form a military alliance to preserve the security of the region, and benefiting from economics of scale? Surely, that would be a more cost-effective approach for the concerned states to achieve the same level of protection without spending more just to acquire military hardware.

Despite the low and remote possibility that ASEAN states would be embroiled in armed conflicts, the reasons given by Narine for the arms build-up could be cause for concern – maritime and territorial disputes, past political and ethnic tensions that still persist, basing military doctrines on potential ‘aggressor’ ASEAN states and falling back on military capabilities as a form of bargaining chip. The pertinent question is how can such a concern be addressed?

The answer lies on the diplomatic front, specifically track II diplomacy, and an increasingly important role within ASEAN for the latter. Track I diplomacy refers to government to government diplomatic interaction which involves the participation of government officials. Track II diplomacy, on the other hand involves private citizens from one state interacting with private citizens from another state to grapple with issues concerning both states. Such private citizens may be journalists, academics, or members of think-tanks or other non-governmental organisations.

Track II diplomacy have an important part to play in conflict resolution. Private citizens, for instance could use their contacts to monitor the situation on the ground on the other side. Track II diplomats from both sides may engage in talks that can pave the way for official negotiations between involved governments (track I). Indeed, a celebration of the impact of track II diplomacy on conflict resolution came from the Middle East – the Palestinian-Israeli conflict paving way to the Oslo Accord. It started off with a Norwegian sociologist, Terje Rod Larsen, initiating discussions between Yair Hirschfeld, an Israeli Jewish academic and Abu Alaa, a Palestinian Liberation Organisation official. Both began meeting secretly and because of continual committment by both sides, the Norwegian government sponsored future meetings. Eventually, meetings from both sides went to the levels of their respective parties, and culminated in the enduring image of Yitzhak Rabin shaking hands with Yasser Arafat at the White House.

Even with the end of the conflicts, track II diplomats have an ever increasingly important part to play in the peace building process. For instance, the latter could be very much involved in the building of communal, social, political and economic ties between both sides.

Nur Bilge Criss and Süheyla Özyıldırım examined using game theory a pair of countries who have been historically and are potentially hostile to each other. In their paper entitled “Survival of Rationalism Between Hostility and Economic Growth”, they worked on the assumption that armament increases the degree of hostility whereas trade reduces the possibility of militarised disputes. They further argued that welfare-maximising decisionmakers have to seek methods other than accumulation of arms to increase the security of their nations, and hence, the strategic nature of trade in overcoming enmity.

Thus, in the setting of two historically and potentially hostile nations created by Criss and Özyıldırım, the involvement of track II diplomacy in conflict resolution and re-creation of bilateral economic ties in addition to ceasing in arms-build up would be considered a rational approach. And the track II diplomats can do more to pave the way for a military union between the two sides – such will create a win-win situation in which economies of scale for defense can be achieved.

What is the other reason why track II diplomacy has an increasingly important role to play in ASEAN? Recall that earlier, two reasons for military build-up in ASEAN are that the weapons are a source of bargaining power in the face of conflicts and a source of prestige. Thus, track II diplomacy offers an option for resolution in the face of conflicts instead of a resort to arms build-up as a bargaining chip.

Hence, in light of the arms build-up within the ASEAN region, although the threat of an armed conflict is remote, the reasons for the build-up as elucidated by Narine is a cause for concern. Track II diplomacy and its role in cementing communal, social, political and economic ties is the way to go in addressing this concern. This means that think tanks, academics, non-governmental organisations, intellectuals, journalists and other non-government actors have a part to play as track II diplomats in ensuring the peace and prosperity of the ASEAN region.