Redefining the Boundaries of Inclusiveness

Min Cheong

Equal and fair citizenship is a concept which originated from the political doctrine of Aristotle. The ideology, as applied to modern society, has undergone permutations in that it does not necessarily pertain to individuals possessing a direct involvement in governance, and instead embodies an amalgamation of rights accorded to citizens within legislation which exists as the basis and framework for ensuring vibrant socio-political activity.

In principle, the implementation of  policies created with the intent of upholding the concepts of equal opportunity and fair participation should not disenfranchise any community within society. This is crucial to the engenderment of stability and accord within the boundaries of any nation, and governments have had to struggle to maintain delicate socio-political equilibria vis-a-vis the prudent and responsible application of policy.

The success of any state-initiated programme is highly contingent upon the profile and needs of the population and how well the policies of that government address issues and quandaries prevalent within society. In a local context, it is important to understand some of the key policies which have shaped the socio-political environment of Singapore.

With the General Elections just around the corner, there has been an increased focus on and examination of policies that many consider contentious. Prevailing concerns revolve around the apparently self-serving redrawing of the boundaries which define constituencies across the island-state by the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP), whose members occupy a distinct majority of seats in parliament, and the framework within which voting ensues, with emphasis on the Group Representation Constituency (GRC) system.

Typically, the lines that demarcate Singapore’s constituencies are modified every four years just before General Elections are due, at the advice of the Electoral Boundaries Review Committee (EBRC). Members of this entity are appointed by the Prime Minister and collaborate with the Elections Department, which operates under the purview of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO).

Political commentators and the public have long remarked that the methodology which is tied to the process of delimiting these electoral divisions is not one that has been audited by individuals and groups in society. Although the reasons given by government officials indicate that population and demographic shifts are responsible for decisions to amend constituency perimeters, the relevant statistics have never accompanied the release of new electoral boundaries and has resulted in widespread speculation that the real reasons are less than politically and ethically justifiable.

Further to that, graphical representations of the divisions appear to advantage the PAP. Glaringly, constituencies with residents who have voted overwhelmingly for opposition parties that have contested those jurisdictions in previous General Elections have often been subsumed, either fractionally or completely, into others whose members are more partial to the PAP.  Also, the period of time between the dissemination of the maps of redrawn boundaries and the General Elections is normally between three months to a week, which does not grant the opposition much allowance to strategise and launch their campaigns.

This phenomenon, coupled with the lack of openness regarding information on the redrawing of boundaries, has resulted in antipathy towards the government and the PAP in particular. Additionally, the perception that the EBRC and Elections Department cannot possibly be totally independent has exacerbated that distrust and led to a stark disconnect between the one-party administration and the people of Singapore.

On a more worrying note, the regular manipulation of boundaries in order to retain political supremacy is indicative of an under-confident government; one that would rather machinate the rules in fear than boldly engage its people in identifying and resolving issues of public consequence. The effect of this exclusion from participation is a politically subjugated citizenry, an immured opposition and a disempowered nation.

To compound the asymmetry of involvement and inclusion, voting in Singapore also comes with its unique set of obstacles – to be specific, the Group Representation Constituency (GRC). Conceived with the purported objective of ensuring minority representation in parliament, GRCs can be deemed to function upon a hybridisation of simple plurality voting and a distorted form of proportional representation where a team of Members of Parliament (MPs) stand for election in that electoral division instead of contesting as separate candidates.

The nonpareil feature of the GRC scheme which sets it apart from other voting and electoral mechanisms is that at least one of the MPs has to be a member of a minority ethnic community (Malay, Indian or Other). In GRCs, between three and six seats are required to be filled. However, incongruently to the manner in which voting is usually applied around the world, the Singaporean electorate is compelled to vote for the party (which, incumbent or opposition, has to field the same number of candidates as there are seats) and not individual contenders.

Firstly, this means that the residents of GRCs will not be able to exercise absolute and streamlined voting power in choosing their preferred candidate(s). Compared to those in Single Member Constituencies (SMCs), which is characterised by  a one-man-one-vote mechanism (even though the ballot still lists the party and not the candidate), the voting strength of the individual and collective members of GRCs are considerably diluted, which is strangely discrepant.

Secondly, as a result of bloc voting which takes place in GRCs, there exists little impetus for any MP within the team to work towards serving the needs of his or her constituents and prove his/her individual competency because it is possible to ride on the coat-tails of the other MPs in the team. However, it does not necessarily follow that there are any truly worthy or popular members in that team; the victorious affiliates might simply have won because other contesting teams could not garner an adequate percentage of votes to emerge first-past-the-post.

Expounding on this problem, voting for a team as opposed to individual aspirants also means that it will be significantly less likely that the candidates who eventually fill the seats in the GRC will closely represent and serve the needs of their constituents. Furthermore, with high barriers to entry for and low returns in contesting a GRC (it costs S$13 000 per candidate to enter the race and opposition parties do not have the financial and human resources to field teams for many GRCs), these electoral divisions either remain uncontested or do not see a representative number of political parties challenge each other for the territory.

Yet another aspect of the GRC system which has been the subject of remonstration is the fact that the PAP uses it to enter inexperienced political candidates into parliament. In effect, this means that untested, possibly unqualified individuals are able to wield administrative power over the country, which is highly unfavourable because of the legitimacy and actual expertise in governance that they are not considered to have.

Moreover, with a dearth in opposition parties contesting GRCs and the existing difficulty in challenging incumbents across the board because of the nature of boundary redefinition as well as candidates/parliamentarians who might not pay heed to the needs of their constituents and citizenry as a whole, there will not likely be an representative marketplace of views and ideas at the legislative level pertaining to important socio-political issues, thereby affecting the quality of discussions and debate in parliament, which will then influence the policies that manifest.

Besides that, it is crucial to note that the very objective upon which the GRC system was premised has not be fulfilled in a satisfactory manner. Even within the scheme, the tenets do not apply to all minority ethnic groups equally inclusively; it is stipulated that three-fifths of all the GRCs must be contested by a team that has a member from the Malay community specifically, disadvantaging individuals from other minority ethnic communities.

Also, with the size of GRCs steadily increasing over the years (with exceptions made in lieu the 2011 General Elections for which the average number of seats per GRC was marginally reduced), the proportion of MPs from minority ethnic groups has in fact declined as compared to before the GRC system was implemented because teams are still fielding only one minority racial group candidate.

As such, the application of the GRC system is not at all sufficiently aligned to the notion of genuine inclusion and is in fact counter to that of meritocracy. One of the nascent forms of the GRC system in proposition was that MPs should contest constituencies as a pair, with one member hailing from a minority ethnic community. However, members of minority racial groups were against the idea because of the concern that it would damage any credibility they possessed in terms of accession to parliament on their own merits of qualification.

Another suggestion was to construe an upper house in parliament with seats filled with installed representatives from minority ethnic groups; It was shelved because political leaders felt that politicians should gain a place in parliament through elections. Therefore, it is interesting to note that the GRC system encapsulates precisely the dubitable practice of providing political contenders access to seats in parliament by means of a process which is both unmeritorious and unrepresentative of the voice of the people.

Further, there is a genuine need to analyse the necessity of minority representation in parliament. The GRC system was conceived from apprehension that the non-homogeneous citizenry would vote for candidates along racial lines. However, David Marshall, one of Singapore’s Chief Ministers, was elected democratically by the people despite being Jewish. Similarly, in 1981, Joshua Benjamin Jeyaratnam won the predominantly-Chinese district of Anson in a by-election. Even though the examples are sparse (and this could be attributed to the nature of political control in Singapore), it does elucidate the fact that race in those cases was not a decisional factor in elections, and is not likely to be now.

Besides that, the purpose of the GRC system in the way it has been used in recent years has been called into question. The PAP has employed the GRC system as a tool to encourage political catechumens to participate in politics, citing entrance though this means as almost certain success. This is tacit, if not blatant, admittance that contesting a GRC is extremely prohibitive for opposition parties, therefore favouring the incumbent (ruling) party. Hence, there is strong reason to believe that the GRC system cannot be entirely equitable, fair and inclusive.

Moreover, the fact that candidates are selected by the competing parties (both incumbent and opposition) rather than by members of society is  rather disconcerting and a problem not many pundits seem to be discussing at this juncture. It comes across as highly irregular for representatives of constituencies to not be based in that area in terms of either residency or prior grassroots work done before the announcement of their candidacies because it is essential for these individuals to be intimately aware of the environment their constituents live in and the issues that arise which may be unique to that particular district.

In principle, the process can be criticised as one lacking accountability to the citizenry. Potential MPs are more likely to uphold their party lines than the rights and needs of the electorate because the former has more power to install and remove these representatives into and from their positions than the people will ever possess under status quo. This is basically institutionalised disenfranchisement; MPs will not be as concerned about their constituents as they would be if they were chosen and given a genuine mandate to administrate by the people; as a result, a disjunction between the citizenry and government will inevitably manifest because the representation is flawed and illegitimate.

Essentially, politically-motivated practices such as pre-election boundary delimitation and the implementation of policies such as the GRC system as well as the process of candidate-selection foster a socio-political environment that does not engage and include and is not equal and fair.

In redefining the boundaries of inclusiveness, equality and fairness, changes to certain institutions and administrative conventions have to be initiated.

Institutionalising political indenture is the mark of an administration that is not sure of its ability to govern well. The resultant policies born of an uncertain government not only repress and restrict, but are ill-poised to properly achieve good in and for the country.

For the advancement of the nation, it is imperative that more participation in and contribution to socio-politics be encouraged. This can be done best with policies that are foundered upon equality, fairness and inclusiveness and an administration that always recognises its duty of care to the citizenry as well as never forgets that a good government does not rule; it serves – because in a political partnership, according to Aristotle, the self cannot exist without the other.