Donaldson Tan
Gaza City being bombarded
The Middle East has always been a hot bed for conflicts. The recent eruption of violence in Gaza Strip has earned Israel condemnation from the international community on the dis-proportionality of its action. Yet it is interesting to note despite the ritual condemnation, no Arab states has actually put forward any important actions to undermine Israel’s occupation in Gaza after the Israel-Hamas truce had expired. As usual, international media is quick to highlight bloodshed, the most attention-grabbing result, while downplaying the role of Hamas in the Israel-Gaza Conflict.
Israel-Gaza Conflict
According to the BBC, the Israel-Gaza Conflict started on 27 December 2008 when Israel launched Operation Cast Lead into the Gaza Strip . While media coverage has been biased in only focusing on the disproportionality of Israel’s military action in the Gaza Strip, it is important to note that things were already brewing in the background. Since 2006, Hamas has fired at least 1,700 rockets into Israel despite Israel’s easing of the blockade on the Gaza Strip. Hamas continued to smuggle ammunitions, firearms and rockets despite its assurance to Israel on its commitment to peace.
Worse still, Hamas accused Israel of violating the ceasefire first when Israeli agents raided a weapons smuggling tunnel in Gaza, despite that weapons smuggling de-facto breaks the ceasefire agreement. When the 6-month truce between Israel and Hamas expired on 18 December 2008, Hamas refused to extend the truce and renewed rocket attacks against Israel on 19 December 2008.
In March 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert vowed to press on with the deadly military operations against militants who have been launching increasingly powerful rockets into Israel. The Israeli action is merely a response to the renewed terrorism originating from the Gaza Strip. Security for Israeli is the primary priority for the current Israeli government.
Action speaks louder than words and this is demonstrated by Israel’s unilateral ceasefire on 17 January 2009 and partial withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Force. Israel’s fight is targeted against Hamas and not the People of Gaza. Having destroyed Hamas’ military camps and 60% of Hamas’ tunnels between Egypt and Gaza, there is no need to continue military action in Gaza. By 21 January 2009, Israel has fully withdrawn its troops from Gaza. This is not the first time that Israel withdrew its troops unilaterally. In 2005, Israel made a unilateral decision to withdraw its military and settlers from the Gaza Strip.
Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum criticised Israel for taking a unilateral approach rather than entering into a deal with Egyptian mediators: “It is an attempt to pre-empt the Egyptian efforts and any other efforts that seek to achieve a withdrawal of the occupying forces, an end to the siege and a ceasefire.” Moreover, the international community and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) support the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, which is repeatedly emphasised in UNSC Resolutions S/RES/1860(2009) and S/RES/1850(2009).
While a somewhat quiet night presided Gaza on the first night of the unilateral ceasefire, Israelis woke up to yet again another morning of Hamas rocket attacks. Surely rocket attacks is not the way to invite your opponent to participate in peace talks hosted by a less-than-neutral neighbour Egypt, one of the Arab League’s only 2 members that actually recognise Israel. In fact, fighting has now resumed. Recent news indicated that the Israeli Air Force conducted air strikes in response to a new wave of rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip.
The way out of the Israel-Gaza Conflict cannot be a one-off temporary solution until the next eruption of fighting. President Obama of the United States said in an Al Arabiya Interview that continued fighting “is not going to result in prosperity and security” for Israelis and Palestinians, and commended the Arab Peace Initiative for being a courageous act.
The Arab Peace Initiative, proposed by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, represents a new holistic approach to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. While security implications on their bordering countries cannot be separated from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, there is notable regional desire for political stability. Most importantly, the Arab Peace Initiative (API) marks a stark departure from the 1967 “Three No’s” that was the centre of Israeli-Arab relations: no peace deals, no diplomatic recognitions, no negotiations. However, a 2008 Angus Reid Global Monitor poll found that 67% of Palestinians and 39% of Israelis support the Arab Peace Initiative.
The Rise of Hamas
Hamas combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism. Its founding charter commits the group to the destruction of Israel, the replacement of the Palestinian Authority with an Islamist state on the West Bank and Gaza, and to raising "the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine". Its leaders have called suicide attacks the "F-16" of the Palestinian people. Hamas leader Abd al-Aziz Rantisi in April 2004 that "peace talks do us no good and we do not believe we can live with the enemy." In fact, Hamas rejects the Arab Peace Initiative.
Hamas started out as the Palestinian chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood – the biggest political opposition organisation in Egypt and the Middle East. It was founded in December 1987 and came to prominence during the First Intifada, a popular Palestinian uprising against Israeli rule that took place between 1987 and 1993.
While the Muslim Brotherhood has denounced violence since 1988, Hamas became well known for carrying out suicide bomb attacks in Israeli and Palestinian territories. Hamas’ first suicide bomb attack took place in April 1993. Hamas leader even hailed the suicide bombers the “F-16s” of Palestine. The United States, European Union, Japan and Israel recognise Hamas as a terrorist organisation.
Prior to winning the 2006 Palestinian Authority General Legislative Elections, Hamas already devotes much of its estimated US$70-million annual budget to an extensive social services network. Hamas funds schools, orphanages, mosques, healthcare clinics, soup kitchens and sports leagues. "Approximately 90 percent of its work is in social, welfare, cultural, and educational activities," writes the Israeli scholar Reuven Paz.
This is in contrast to the Palestinian Authority, which often fails to provide such services. While some Palestinians perceive Hamas as a honest organisation, there are some Palestinians who disagree with its terrorist policies. In comparison to the corrupt Fatah that represents the Palestinian Authority, Hamas is the lesser evil to the Gaza electorate. Hamas is not a better choice over peace and prosperity for the whole of Palestine.
The 2006 Palestinian Authority General Legislative Elections established Hamas as the municipal government of Gaza Strip while Fatah remains as the unity government of the Palestinian Authority. Many political punters had hoped that Hamas would move away from violence to achieve its political aims, yet its military wing, the so-called Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade, continued to operate. Rivalry between Hamas and the ruling party Fatah escalated to a military coup that took place in June 2007.
Hamas seized complete control of the Gaza’s municipal government, ousted Fatah’s representative on Gaza’s municipal parliament and drove out the Palestinian Authority’s security forces, forcing President Mahmond Abbas of the Palestinian Authority to declare a state of emergency. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ali Babacan even urged Hamas to decide “whether it wants to be a political movement or an armed group”. Hamas is only one step short of declaring Gaza Strip independent.
Prospects of Peace
One remarkable thing to note about Israel’s Operation Cast Lead was that no Arab state moved quickly to take aggressive steps on Palestinians’ behalf. Apart from ritual condemnation, weeks into the offensive, no Arab state had done anything significant. Why is it so? The Arab states view the creation of a Palestinian state as not in their interests. They have never acknowledged Palestinian rights beyond the destruction of Israel.
In theory, they have backed the Palestinian cause, but in practice they have ranged from indifferent to hostile toward it. Iran is the only major power that is now attempting to act on behalf of the Palestinians. Being a non-Arab state, Iranian involvement is regarded by the Arab regimes as one more reason to distrust the Palestinians. The question of an independent Palestinian state would not be settled even if Israel were destroyed.
All the countries bordering Palestine have serious territorial claims on Palestinian lands, not to mention a profound distrust of Palestinian intentions. For example, Syria view Palestine as an integral part of Syria, much as they saw Lebanon and Jordan. They saw the Sykes-Picot agreement as a violation of Syrian territorial integrity, and opposed the existence of an independent Jewish state for the same reason they opposed Lebanese or Jordanian independence.
Historically, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and Palestine today were part of the same province under Greater Syria. In fact, the Syrians have always been uncomfortable with the concept of Palestinian statehood and actually invaded Lebanon in the 1970s to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Fatah .
The Hashemite Monarchy of Jordan has a far more critical view of Palestinians than the Syrians. After the partition of the British-administered Palestine in 1948, Jordan took control of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. But there were deep tensions with the Palestinians, and the Hashemite Monarchy saw Israel as a guarantor of Jordanian security against the Palestinians. They never intended an independent Palestinian state.
Jordan could have granted Palestine independence between 1948 and 1967. In September 1970, Jordan fought a bloody war against the Palestinians, forcing the PLO out of Jordan and into Lebanon. Half of Jordanians have Palestinian ethnicity. Jordan remain very fearful that the last vestige of the Hashemite Monarchy could collapse under the weight of Palestinians in the kingdom and in the West Bank, paving the way for a Palestinian takeover of Jordan.
Gaza and the West Bank are very different places. The West Bank has a population density of a little over 600 people per square mile, many living in discrete urban areas distributed through rural areas. The West Bank has a much higher degree of self-sufficiency, even in its current situation. Under the best of circumstances, the West Bank will not be entirely dependent on external economic relations. In the worst of circumstances, the West Bank will not be entirely dependent on outside aid.
On the other hand, Gaza is about 25 miles long and no more than 7.5 miles at its greatest width, with a total area of about 146 square miles. Gaza has a population density of about 11,060 per square mile, roughly that of a city. And like a city, Gaza’s primary economic activity should be commerce or manufacturing, but neither is possible given the active hostility of Israel and Egypt. 95% of Gaza’s economy had collapsed due to Israel’s blockade.
Gaza is a compact city incapable of supporting itself in its current circumstances and overwhelmingly dependent on outside aid. Under the best of circumstances, Gaza will be entirely dependent on external economic relations. In the worst of circumstances, it will be entirely dependent on outside aid. Were Gaza physically part of the West Bank, it would be the latter’s largest city, making Palestine a more complex nation-state.
If a Palestinian state were created, it is not clear that the dynamics of Gaza, the city-state, and the West Bank, more of a nation-state, would be compatible. Under the best of circumstances, Gaza could not survive at its current size without a rapid economic evolution that would generate revenue from trade, banking and other activities common in successful Mediterranean cities. But these cities have either much smaller populations or much larger areas supported by surrounding territory. It is not clear how Gaza could get from where it is to where it would need to be to attain viability.
Gaza has the military advantage of being dense and urbanised. It can be defended. But it is an economic catastrophe, and given its demographics, the only way out of its condition is to export workers to Israel. To a lesser extent, the same is true for the West Bank. Palestine has been exporting workers for generations. Any peace agreement with Israel would increase the exportation of labour locally, with Palestinian labour moving into the Israeli market. Therefore, the paradox is that while the current situation allows a degree of autonomy amid social, economic and military catastrophe, a settlement would dramatically undermine Palestinian autonomy by creating Palestinian dependence on Israel.
One immediate consequence of Palestinian independence would be a massive outflow of Palestinians from Gaza to the West Bank. The economic conditions of the West Bank are better, but the massive domestic migration would buckle the West Bank’s economy. Tensions currently visible between the West Bank under Fatah and Gaza under Hamas would exacerbate. The West Bank could not absorb the population flow from Gaza, but Palestinians in Gaza could not remain in Gaza except in virtually total dependence on foreign aid.
The only conceivable solution to the economic issue would be for Palestinians to seek work en masse in more dynamic economies. This would mean either emigration or entering the work force in Egypt, Jordan, Syria or Israel. Egypt has its own serious economic troubles, and Syria and Jordan are both too small to solve this problem. The only economy that could employ surplus Palestinian labour is Israel’s.
Security concerns apart, while the Israeli economy might be able to metabolise this labour, it would turn an independent Palestinian state into an Israeli economic dependency. The ability of the Israelis to control labour flows has always been one means for controlling Palestinian behaviour. To move even more deeply into this relationship would mean an effective annulment of Palestinian independence.
The degree to which Palestine would depend on Israeli labour markets would turn Palestine into an extension of the Israeli economy. And the driver of this will not be the West Bank, which might be able to create a viable economy over time, but Gaza, which cannot. Accepting a Palestinian state along lines even approximating the 1948 partition, regardless of the status of Jerusalem, would not result in an independent Palestinian state in anything but name.
Conclusion
The problems of an independent Palestinian state will not be settled with or without the destruction of Israel. Neither would any two-state solution for the Middle East situation rectify complex geopolitical issues in the region. The two-state solution is merely a political rhetoric among the Arab League and the international community.
Palestinians would not be better off too if the Palestine breaks down into 2 independent regions. The Middle East situation is made further more complex as the emergence of Hamas as a key player represents renewed Palestinian nationalism and militancy in the region. Hamas, no doubt, is a threat to political stability and power balance in the Middle East.
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Photo courtesy of AFP.
